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Why do we trade? MostAmericans would answerthis question with some
reference to the benefits of ex-
panded markets for U.S. goods and
more job opportunities. However, if
asked the question, why do we
work? most would respond that we
work to earn money so that we can
buy things. At a personal level, we
intuitively know that trading our spe-
cialized labor with others (using
money as the means of transactions)
gives us a higher standard of living
than if we tried to produce every-
thing ourselves. We know and act on
the knowledge that specialization
enhances our individual wealth. But
economists have known for more
than 200 years that what holds at the
individual level also holds nation-
ally. A country will have more
wealth and a higher standard of liv-
ing if the country specializes in pro-
ducing those products that it is
relatively good at producing, export-
ing the surplus, and using the pro-
ceeds to buy imported products.
The notion that the gains from
foreign trade should be measured
by what we import, not by what we
export, is difficult for many to ac-
cept. Clearly, the statements of
some of our leaders in Washington
suggest that they see the benefits of
trade in terms of our ability to in-
crease exports, not in terms of our
ability to increase our imports. For
example, Secretary of Agriculture
Veneman frequently argues that she
wants to open up overseas export
markets for the benefit of U.S. farm-
ers. And it is a common bipartisan
belief in Congress that increased
imports are actually bad for the
United States. AgWeb.com (“Inside
Washington Today,” October 1) re-
ported that Senator Lott (R-Miss.)
held up the legislation that granted
normal trade relations status to
Vietnam because of his concerns
that the Vietnamese catfish industry
threatens U.S. catfish farmers. And
Senator Baucus (D-Mont.) has led
efforts to limit Canadian softwood
lumber because such imports hurt
American lumber mills.
As major exporters, Iowa and
other Corn Belt states have a keen
interest in the direction of U.S. trade
policy. Will the United States follow its
free trade rhetoric and pursue global
free trade agreements that expand
trade? Or will concern about the im-
pacts of imports limit expansion of
trade? While nobody can say with cer-
tainty whether the United States will
become more or less protectionist, a
closer examination of the issues will
help clarify the issues so that a more
informed debate can take place.
IMPORTANCE OF EXPORTS TO
CORN BELT AGRICULTURE
The United States has exported an
average of 20 percent of its corn pro-
duction and 45 percent of its soy-
bean production over the last five
years. We exported additional
amounts of corn and soybeans as
meat. Changes in the demand for U.S
corn, soybeans, pork, beef, and poul-
try by overseas consumers have a
direct impact on the prices Iowa
farmers receive for their production.
This direct link is why many look to
the expansion of feed and meat ex-
ports as the only way to achieve sus-
tained strength in market prices.
Most U.S. farm leaders rail
against markets closed to U.S. ex-
ports. But how easy is it for foreign
countries to open up their markets? A
look at our own political debates
about protectionist policies will
show why such openings are difficult
to achieve.
THE POLITICS OF TRADE POLICY
If all our political leaders were well
trained in economics, then they
would accept the fact that we export
goods to earn foreign exchange so
that we can purchase imported items.
If, in addition to being good econo-
mists, they did not care if they were re-
elected, then they would adopt the
trade policy that would create the
most wealth for U.S. residents. That
policy would be for us to unilaterally
take down all of our trade barriers.
This action would lower import
prices, raise our standard of living,
and increase the level of domestic
competition. This increased competi-
tion would help to keep consumer
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prices low in the future and would
lead to increased productivity as com-
panies invest to stay ahead of domes-
tic and international competition.
If unilateral trade liberalization
would be so good for us, why haven’t
we adopted it? The answer is simple.
Enhancing national wealth is not the
goal of trade policy. Policy results
from the natural desire of our political
leaders to respond to the interests of
their constituents. And whose inter-
ests are most likely to be brought to
the attention of our leaders? The inter-
ests of those groups for which policy
benefits are large enough to justify the
hiring of a lobbyist.
In Montana, owners of wheat-
producing land and timberland have
an interest in limiting wheat and
lumber imports from Canada. Steel
manufacturers and labor unions
that represent steelworkers in Penn-
sylvania and Ohio have an interest
in limiting steel imports from South
Korea and the European Union (EU)
to maintain steel profits and steel
jobs. Sugar producers in North Da-
kota, Minnesota, and Florida want
continued restrictions on sugar im-
ports to maintain their artificially
high sugar profits. Clearly, it makes
economic sense for all these groups
to fund lobbying efforts to convince
Congress and the Administration to
adopt protectionist policies. And
these same forces are at work in ev-
ery country where competition
from U.S. exports threatens their
own vested interests.
To see why anti-import forces
often win policy debates, consider
the U.S. sugar program. A recent re-
port by the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) estimated that U.S.
consumers would gain between
$770 million and $1.96 billion per
year if we completely opened our
market to foreign sugar. This is a
substantial amount of money, but it
amounts to only $2.70 to $7.25 per
U.S. resident per year. The GAO re-
port indicated that each U.S. sugar
producer would lose an average of
about $125,000 a year, with many
growers losing in excess of $1 mil-
lion if sugar imports were liberal-
ized. In this case, the small gains to
the many would seem to outweigh
the losses to the few if we opened
our market to imported sugar. Never-
theless, this economic imbalance
does not usually translate into adop-
tion of a free trade policy because
Congress simply does not hear from
outraged sugar consumers. It only
hears from outraged sugar farmers.
The political balance of power in
trade policy favors those who advo-
cate for protectionism. The benefits
of protection fall to the few who can
organize and lobby for it, whereas
the costs of protectionism are borne
by the many (all of us) who do not
find it worthwhile to spend time and
money in support of free trade.
WHAT ABOUT UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES?
Of course, companies and indus-
tries that lobby for protectionist
policies do not couch their argu-
ments in terms of their desire for
higher profits. Rather, they typi-
cally argue their case by citing “un-
fair” competition from foreign
exporters. Often the “unfairness” is
caused by lower labor costs in the
exporting countries. But unfair
practices can also include govern-
ment subsidies to the exporting in-
dustries, direct subsidies to
exports, and preferential tax treat-
ments. Without some protection,
lobbyists argue, companies and in-
dustries would be go out of busi-
ness, and U.S. consumers would be
forced to buy from foreign suppli-
ers. What should be the response
to these arguments?
One response is to simply say,
so what? If a company in a foreign
country chooses to supply us with a
product at a price lower than we
ourselves can make it, then we had
better take advantage of the offer. If
an exporting country’s taxpayers
want to subsidize our consumption,
then who is taking advantage of
whom?
Few countries, with the notable
exceptions of Hong Kong, Singapore,
and New Zealand, have adopted this
“so what” response. This is not sur-
FALL 2001        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT   3
Iowa Ag Review
prising given that profits for domes-
tic companies are at risk, and those
at-risk profits can be used to lobby
for relief. Besides, if domestic com-
panies or industries go out of busi-
ness because of import competition
helped by excessive government
subsidies, they may have a legiti-
mate complaint.
Where can harmed industries
get relief? From the federal govern-
ment? There is a problem with al-
lowing the domestic government to
adjudicate a trade complaint. Past
experience suggests that this re-
sults in too much relief and too few
imports. (See “Coming Home to
Roost: Proliferating Antidumping
Laws and the Growing Threat to U.S.
Exports,” by Brink Lindsey and Dan
Ikenson, Center for Trade Policy
Studies, July 30, 2001.)
The alternative response is to
let a more disinterested third party
adjudicate trade complaints, be-
yond domestic boundaries. That
third party is the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO).
ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
The WTO was formed upon comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations in 1994. Its primary
purpose is to review trade policies
and to settle trade disputes between
member countries. The WTO has no
ability to enforce its findings, so it
can settle disputes only if member
countries choose to adhere to WTO
rulings. So far, the track record of
adherence is mixed. The EU was
found to be out of compliance when
it banned U.S. beef imports pro-
duced with growth hormones. But
the ban continues. The WTO has
ruled twice against the United
States for use of the foreign sales
corporation tax, which could lead to
$4 billion worth of sanctions if the
dispute continues.
If the WTO finds that a country
is out of compliance, then trade
partners are allowed to use sanc-
tions in the form of import tariffs
against the offending country’s ex-
ports. As a result, the U.S. has raised
the cost of certain European exports
by $116 million in response to the
EU ban on hormone beef, subse-
quently increasing the cost of these
items for U.S. consumers. It might
seem odd that a country punishes
another country by taxing its own
citizens with import tariffs, but that
is the only remedy offered.
For the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism to work, countries must
voluntarily give up some of their
economic sovereignty and follow
WTO rulings. The benefits to the
world trading system from reduced
national sovereignty are obvious:
trade volume and value will expand,
accelerating world wealth creation.
Giving up some economic sover-
eignty is good for each individual
country as well, because WTO rul-
ings can be an effective counter-
weight against lobbyists for
domestic industries that seek pro-
tectionist policies. Thus, for ex-
ample, if Canada brings a WTO
complaint against United States soft-
wood lumber tariffs and wins, then
U.S. politicians that have supported
the tariffs can say that they have
done all they can do, and U.S. citi-
zens can enjoy the benefits of less
expensive wood.
FUTURE TRADE POLICY AND
AGRICULTURE
The best hope for expanded exports
of U.S. corn, soybeans, and meat
products lies with the WTO. The
fourth biannual WTO trade minis-
ters’ conference is scheduled to meet
in Doha, Qatar, on November 9. (The
last conference was held in Seattle in
1999.) At the top of the agenda is an
agreement to start a new round of
trade liberalization talks. Trade in
agricultural products likely will be a
large part of a new round. However,
developing-country members are
protesting that they did not receive
enough of the benefits from the last
round of talks. They argue that they
still face unfair competition from EU
export subsidies, import tariffs, and
producer subsidies. They dislike U.S.
production subsidies and import re-
strictions on textiles and certain ag-
ricultural products such as peanuts
and sugar. Developing countries will
need to be convinced that they will
have more time to implement the
last agreement, and that any new
agreement will open up developed-
country markets to their goods.
If the United States and the Euro-
pean Union are serious about want-
ing to increase world trade, then a
demonstration of good faith would
go a long way toward showing that a
new round of trade negotiations will
actually benefit the developing
countries. Such a demonstration
could be a speedup in the timetable
by which textile trade is liberalized.
Of course, U.S. cotton farmers would
line up to fight this liberalization. Or,
the European Union could further
lower its wheat support price and
wheat export subsidies. Of course,
French wheat farmers would likely
drive their tractors to Paris in pro-
test. Or, the United States could re-
place all non-recourse loans with
recourse loans, which would elimi-
nate the government-provided in-
centive to keep producing corn,
soybeans, cotton, and wheat when
the market is signaling farmers to
cut production. We all know what
the reaction to this proposal would
be. Nevertheless, developing coun-
tries are looking for such a demon-
stration. If we want to move forward
with further trade liberalization,
then the United States and the Euro-
pean Union may have to sacrifice a
few sacred cows currently protected
from import competition.u
If an exporting country’s
taxpayers want to subsi-
dize our consumption,
then who is taking
advantage of whom?
